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COMPARATIVE DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RETHINKING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE USING
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION: THE LAY OF THE LANDS
The Administrative Procedure Acti (APA) is as much a constitution
as a statute.' As with all constitutions, the nature of the APA goes far
in determining the topography of the procedural landscape that grows
upon it. The Act regulates agency procedure by creating a transsub-
stantive procedural floor applicable to virtually all agencies that may
be, and often is, supplemented by substance-specific procedures that
Congress and agencies establish. (Courts, importantly, are forbidden
by Supreme Court precedent from imposing procedural requirements
that exceed those contained in the APA.) To the geographically in-
clined, the APA is the floor of a broad procedural valley; across the
valley lie scattered hills of substance-specific procedure piled up by
agencies and legislatures based on judgments about which procedures
befit which agencies. The resulting landscape is an uneven terrain in
which all agencies share a basic procedure, but procedural require-
ments as a whole differ from agency to agency and, consequently, sub-
ject matter to subject matter.
This administrative constitution accords agencies wide discretion to
enact rules and adjudicate controversies, which courts review for "rea-
sonableness. '3  When courts do overturn an agency's action - or,
rarely, a congressional delegation - they tend to do so through the
imposition of rules that generate incentives for structured processes,
rather than through commands that impose specific procedures for
agency actors to follow. United States v. Mead Corp.,4 for example,
dangles Chevron deference 5 as a carrot to entice Congress and agencies
' 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-7o6 (2000 & Supp. IlI 2003).
2 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039, 1039 (1997) (explaining that, in important ways, "our experience with the APA paral-
lels that with the Constitution"); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living
and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1986) ("My thesis is a simple one: the APA is more
like a constitution than a statute."). Justice Scalia remarked in 1978 that it was "obvious even to
the obtuse ... that the Supreme Court regarded the APA as a sort of superstatute, or subconstitu-
tion, in the field of administrative process." Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C.
Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 345, 363.
3 See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Contro-
versy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1978).
4 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
5 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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to employ formal procedures but leaves it to those actors to determine
precisely what kind.
Elsewhere, the Bill of Rights (plus a few lines of the Fourteenth
Amendment) frames another proceduralist constitution: the constitu-
tion of criminal procedure. Like the administrative constitution, the
criminal procedure constitution is transsubstantive, cutting across dif-
ferent types and severities of crimes. Here, again, legislative and ex-
ecutive actors are free to supplement the constitutional floor with sub-
stance-specific (or transsubstantive) procedures of their own design.
But unlike the administrative constitution, the judicially interpreted
floors of the criminal procedure constitution are detailed and demand-
ing in a way that tends to stifle substance-specific supplementation. In
many places, the criminal procedure constitution "occupies the field
' 6
- picture a high procedural plateau, not a valley. The resulting land-
scape is more even, comprising a basically uniform code of judge-
written procedural rules applicable to rape, fraud, and drug possession
alike.
Here, too, agency actors (prosecutors) are accorded remarkably
wide discretion to "adjudicate" cases - through plea bargaining.7
This adjudication is the norm for criminal justice, leading to roughly
ninety-five percent of all convictions.8 Unlike agency action under the
administrative constitution, however, plea bargaining need not survive
"reasonableness" review. And in contrast to the administrative setting,
when courts overturn executive action in the criminal context, they
typically do so through top-down, process-imposing rules that require
specific actors to do (or not to do) very specific things. (Think
Miranda.9)
The administrative and criminal procedure constitutions support
two procedural topographies so dissimilar they might have evolved on
6 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Jus-
tice, 107 YALE L.J. I, 17 ('997).
7 See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2120 (1998) ("[F]or most defendants the primary adjudication they receive is, in fact,
an administrative decision by a state functionary, the prosecutor, who acts essentially in an in-
quisitorial mode."); see also Panel Discussion: The Expanding Prosecutorial Role from Trial Coun-
sel to Investigator and Administrator, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 679, 684 (1999) [hereinafter Panel]
("Prosecutors are the judges. They decide who is guilty... Who sentences? .. .[T]he prosecutor
.") (comments of then-Professor Gerard E. Lynch).
8 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 2003, at 426 tbl.5.24 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore
eds., 2004) [hereinafter 2003 SOURCEBOOKI, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook (fed-
eral court convictions); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCE-
BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.46.2002 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L.
Pastore eds., 2004) [hereinafter ONLINE SOURCEBOOKI, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t5 4 62oo2.pdf (state court felony convictions).
9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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different planets, yet they coexist on the very same map of American
law. Drawing inspiration from comparative constitutionalism, this
Note contrasts these two procedural constitutions along three major
axes, confronting three far-reaching questions. First, when should pro-
cedure be transsubstantive and when substance-specific? Does it
make sense that the FTC and the EPA follow different procedures
whereas homicide and fraud are governed by the same rules? Second,
what is the proper level of judicial review of agency action? Does rea-
sonableness review get it right, and if so, should courts review plea
bargains - the criminal justice analog to administrative adjudication
- for reasonableness?1o Third, when courts do regulate process, how
should they do so? What are the advantages and disadvantages of
process-imposing rules like Miranda relative to process-generating
rules like Mead?
Comparative constitutional scholars teach that "[c]omparison is at
the center of all serious inquiry and learning."'  They milk that in-
sight, however, largely at the transnational level. This Note suggests
the potential of domesticating comparative constitutionalism, in what
might be called "comparative domestic constitutionalism." Although
all comparative endeavors are vulnerable to the objection that contex-
tual differences render the comparisons irrelevant,12 comparison here
is indeed fruitful because, in many senses, criminal law is administra-
tive law. The typical criminal case is "adjudicated" not by a court, but
by an agency actor: the prosecutor. "Agencies" rule over corrections
and sentencing as well. 13 Recent scholarship capitalizing on this rela-
tionship peppers the field of criminal procedure. 14
10 At first blush, plea bargains, which hinge on at least nominal acceptance by defendants,
appear more analogous to agency-negotiated settlements than to adjudications. Yet in the typical
case, prosecutors alone possess the power to set the terms of the deal. For this reason, "the images
conjured by the verb 'to bargain' are somewhat misleading." Lynch, supra note 7, at 2132. Fur-
thermore, the subset of plea bargains in which defendants would wish to invoke reasonableness
review to undo the terms of their pleas looks the least like negotiated settlements and the most
like adjudications.
I1 NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2003).
12 See id. at 2-3.
13 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 721-22 (2oo5) (describ-
ing the role of agencies in criminal justice and calling prosecutors "the classic enforcement
agency").
14 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989 (2oo6); Lynch, supra note 7; Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delega-
tion, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999); Matthew C. Stephenson, Bu-
reaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise 21-22 (Apr. 4, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). The progenitor of this scholarship, by
popular account, was Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRE-
TIONARY JUSTICE (Illini Books 197 1) (1969). Yet even before Professor Davis, Professor Sanford
Kadish noted that "the correctional agency is not sui generis, but another administrative agency
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While this Note is in large part descriptive and comparative, its
normative focus is on criminal procedure and what that field might
learn from the administrative constitution. Borrowing again from
comparative constitutional scholars, this Note supposes that the prin-
cipal benefit of comparative work is its capacity to reveal the presup-
positions that drive generally unquestioned "domestic" constitutional
norms.'5 By comparison to the administrative constitution, then, this
Note aspires to challenge criminal procedure's norms of judicially im-
posed transsubstantivity, a hands-off approach to plea bargaining, and
the imposition, rather than generation, of process. Given its ambitious
goal and limited space, the Note paints constitutional landscapes with
the widest of brushes, obscuring doctrinal quirks in the hope of prob-
ing deeper. Driving this approach is a belief that reform in criminal
procedure will come not from tweaking this particular conduct rule or
that, but from shifting the bedrock that supports the entire edifice.
II. SUBSTANCE-SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL REGULATION
A tour of the administrative state reveals different procedural law
at each stop. The EPA, for example, publishes reports by a Scientific
Review Committee and the National Academy of Sciences before
promulgating rules. 16 And the FTC accompanies its rules with a state-
ment of economic effect, including the impact on small businesses and
consumers. 7 The connection between agencies and particular sub-
stantive themes thus implies that administrative procedure is, in large
part, substance-specific. Moreover, even within one substantive do-
main, agencies are free to streamline procedures when a particular
case presents good cause,' meaning that administrative procedure is
often not only substance-specific, but also case-specific.
Substance-specific procedural regulation - especially that crafted
by agencies themselves - generates a number of interrelated benefits.
First, almost tautologically, substance-specific procedures may be tai-
lored to the particular subject matter under investigation, increasing
efficacy. 19 Complex scientific or technical matters, for example, might
call for sequential procedures, each with its own set of reviews and
which requires its own administrative law." Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in
the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARv. L. REV. 904, 931 (1962).
15 DORSEN ET AL., supra note ii, at 8.
16 42 U.S.C. § 7 60 7(d)(3) (2000).
17 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(i) (2000).
18 See 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 3 (b)(B), (d)(3) (2000).
19 See Stephen F. Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 455 (1975) (encouraging courts to permit




checks, or for broader and more detailed notice rules, so that the rele-
vant scientific community can participate and correct any policy er-
rors. Volatile decisions in which mistakes threaten tremendous social
costs may warrant unusually extensive procedures as well.20
Second, substance-specific regimes conduce to efficient resource al-
location.21 For example, broadcast regulation is relatively open-ended,
and the FCC may benefit from receiving diverse public views before
publishing a proposed rule. But for the Atomic Energy Commission,
processing such input might burn valuable resources better spent buy-
ing expertise.22  Requiring both agencies to observe the same proce-
dures would be wasteful. And the same effect replicates itself within a
single agency's range of affairs. The D.C. Circuit recognized as much
when it excused the EPA from formal, trial-type procedures for mat-
ters in which the factual issues "'relate[d] almost entirely to technical
(or policy) matters' that . . . '[could] just as easily (perhaps more effec-
tively) be resolved through analysis of the administrative record and
... statements of the parties.' 23
Third, substance-specific procedural regulation increases fairness
by providing interested parties the opportunity to voice their concerns
effectively given the substantive issues at play.
Despite these significant upsides, substance specificity in adminis-
trative law was far from inevitable. Indeed, there was a time when it
looked as though procedural regulation in the administrative system
was becoming increasingly transsubstantive, as courts reviewing
agency decisions imposed whatever procedures they felt were neces-
sary for a "fair" proceeding.2 4 In effect, these judicial decisions flooded
the procedural valley, submerging certain agency-specific procedural
hills and leaving others with only their peaks exposed.
In 1978, the Supreme Court intervened and drained the valley. In
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. ,25 the Court unanimously barred judges from supple-
menting APA-mandated rulemaking procedures with devices of their
20 See Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Some-
what Different View, 91 HARv L. REV. 1823, 1825 (1978).
21 See id. at 1826, 1828.
22 For an insightful discussion of the impact of regulatory enactment costs on agency invest-
ment in expertise, see Stephenson, supra note 14.
23 Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Issuance
of and Administrative Hearings on RCRA Section 3oo8(h) Corrective Action Orders for Hazard-
ous Waste Management Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,256, 12,257 (Apr. 13, i988)).
24 See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1488
(1983) ("During the i96o's and 1970's, the courts ... wr[ote] a detailed, judge-made code of ad-
ministrative procedure for rulemaking."); see also Scalia, supra note 2, at 348-52 (recounting the
history leading up to Vermont Yankee).
25 435 U.S. 519 (978).
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own creation. 26  "Agencies are free to grant additional procedural
rights," the Court admonished, "but reviewing courts are generally not
free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.
27
The Court's decision was rooted in notions of procedural substance
specificity. The Court quoted legislative history calling the APA "an
outline of minimum essential rights and procedures" (in other words,
merely a valley).28 It was up to the agencies to determine "when extra
procedural devices should be employed" beyond this minimum.2 9 Al-
lowing courts to demand additional procedures, the Court feared,
would sanction an undesirable uniformity of procedure because agen-
cies "would undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every
instance. "30
The better idea, and Congress's original plan, was to have agencies
craft procedural rules optimized around their internal organization and
the nature of the area they were charged with regulating. Congress
had determined "that administrative agencies and administrators will
be familiar with the industries which they regulate and will be in a
better position than federal courts or Congress itself to design proce-
dural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of
the agency involved. '31 Consequently, "the agency should normally be
allowed to 'exercise its administrative discretion in deciding how, in
light of internal organization considerations, it may best proceed to de-
velop the needed evidence."' ' 32
Vermont Yankee has sometimes been honored in the breach,33 but it
nevertheless continues to exert tremendous force over the trajectory of
contemporary administrative law. Crucially, however, there is no Ver-
mont Yankee of criminal procedure - there is nothing in criminal pro-
cedure keeping courts from turning a constitutional valley into a pla-
teau, creating the very uniformity administrative law fought to escape.
26 See id. at 524-25; see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-56
(199o) (applying Vermont Yankee to agency adjudication).
27 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (emphases added).
28 Id. at 546 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-i98o, at i6 (1946)).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 547; see also Scalia, supra note 2, at 386 ("The APA did not envision a rigid uniform-
ity, but left it to each agency to adopt whatever procedures above the established minimum
seemed desirable for its programs.").
31 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 525 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)) (in-
ternal quotation mark omitted).
32 Id. at 544 (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n v. TtIanscon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326,
333 (1976)).
33 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion,
198o UTAH L. REV. 3, 15-17 (describing how lower courts, in the first few years after Vermont
Yankee, had already devised ways to avoid its dictates); see also ERNEST GELLHORN &
RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 32 1-22 (4 th ed. 1997) (describing
modes of judicial supervision of agency procedure after Vermont Yankee).
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Indeed, criminal procedure today is largely transsubstantive. With
only a few exceptions, such as rape shield laws, 34 the bulk of criminal
procedure applies identically to crimes of every ilk.
But given substance specificity's benefits, how did criminal proce-
dure evolve into a system so transsubstantive? A grossly simplified
historical account might go like this: The Warren Court's criminal
procedure innovations enforced the provisions of the Constitution
through blanket conduct rules applicable across the board. 35  The
Court's new commands were detailed and demanding - a high floor
more like a plateau than a valley.36  States that were experimenting
with criminal procedure regulation - and there were many such
states37 - were pushed out of the field, along with any substance-
specific regulations they had fashioned or intended to fashion. 38 State
regulations were no longer cost-effective when piled atop the Warren
Court's already demanding requirements. 3 9 So, for the most part, leg-
islatures stopped innovating and stopped regulating, leaving the
Court's detailed transsubstantive rules to reign supreme, as they still
do today. In the criminal context, the law books are virtually devoid
of substance-specific procedural regulation by legislatures and execu-
tive actors. The precise phenomenon the Vermont Yankee Court feared
for administrative law - rigid uniformity - has come to dominate
criminal procedure.
This transsubstantivity has real costs. For instance, the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" requirement prescribes a balancing
34 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412.
35 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (196I) (ap-
plying the exclusionary rule to the states).
36 Miranda's progeny are especially good examples. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 441-42 (1984) (holding that arrests are custodial though traffic stops may not be); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that questioning in a police station is
not custodial if the suspect's presence was voluntary).
37 Prior to Mapp, twenty-six states had adopted the exclusionary rule (eight since 1949, when
the Supreme Court rejected it). Of these eight, four adopted the rule by statute, including one
state that passed its statute a year after a judge had rejected the rule. Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Proce-
dure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV 1361, 1379-8o (2004). Localities were experimenting with
regulation of police interrogation before Miranda, too. As Professor Lain reports, "[a]cross the
country, police departments in a number of metropolitan areas - including Denver, Detroit,
Minneapolis, and Philadelphia - had ... begun warning suspects of their rights well before the
Supreme Court forced them to do so." Id. at 1411. The FBI gave warnings as well. Id.
38 Michigan, for example, had a substance-specific exclusionary rule prior to Mapp. See Peo-
ple v. Gonzales, 97 NW.2d i6, 22 (Mich. 1959). Arizona employed a "murder scene exception" to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement until Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978).
39 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, i19 HARV. L. REV.
780, 791-802 (2006). Professor David Sklansky suggests another explanation, which is that consti-
tutional rulings let legislatures "off the hook" and allow them to shift their attention to other is-
sues. See David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 119 HARV. L. REV. F.
56, 63-64 (2oo6), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/i 19/jano6/sklansky.pdf.
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test, pitting citizens' privacy interests against the government's interest
in ferreting out criminal activity. Within this balancing framework,
different crimes give rise to different government interests. The social
gains from seizing a murder weapon, for example, far outweigh those
from seizing a few ounces of marijuana. One would think, then -
given the balance - that the Fourth Amendment's standards would
be easier to satisfy in the murder case. But this is not so: the standard
is identical regardless of the crime. As a result, if the standard is
geared toward the murder case, it is far too lax for the marijuana case;
if it gets the marijuana case right, it is too restrictive for a murder. Or,
of course, it might be somewhere in between: too lax for marijuana
and too strict for murder.40 Transsubstantivity is the root of this evil.
The transsubstantive Fourth Amendment spawns some perplexing
results. First you get Mincey v. Arizona,4 1 in which homicide detec-
tives arrived on the scene to smoking guns and bleeding bodies, in-
cluding one wounded officer. After calling for medical assistance, the
detectives conducted a long, thorough, warrantless search of the crime
scene, Mincey's apartment.4 The Supreme Court excluded all of the
evidence the detectives found, concluding that the circumstances had
not been exigent enough to justify the failure to obtain a warrant.43
The Court considered and rejected Arizona's "murder scene exception"
to the warrant requirement. "If the warrantless search of a homicide
scene is reasonable," the Court asked rhetorically, "why not the war-
rantless search of the scene of a rape, a robbery, or a burglary? '4 4 The
easy answer: homicide gives rise to greater government interests.
But you also get Illinois v. McArthur,45 in which transsubstantivity
pushed the Court to the other extreme. There, officers prevented
McArthur from entering his own home for two hours while they ob-
tained a search warrant to look for contraband inside. The contra-
band? A pipe, a box, and less than 2.5 grams of marijuana - totaling
two misdemeanor charges.4 6 The Supreme Court rejected McArthur's
argument that the minor nature of his offenses called into question the
reasonableness of the government's seizure.47 While reasonable people
could disagree, it seems plausible that both Mincey and McArthur
40 See William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 849 (2001).
41 437 U.S. 385.
42 Id. at 388-89.
43 See id. at 394-95.
44 Id. at 393. Ironically, the Court issued Mincey - explicitly rejecting a state's transsubstan-
tive approach - within three months of issuing Vermont Yankee.
45 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
46 Id. at 329.
47 See id. at 335-36.
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were wrongly decided. 48 Some offenses are simply worse than others,
and the permissible privacy infringements in investigating crimes
should track the differences among them.49
A particularly unpalatable implication of Fourth Amendment
transsubstantivity is that it encourages the Court to condone for all in-
vestigations tactics necessary only for some. For example, few would
dispute that undercover police work is essential to successful enforce-
ment of drug laws. 50 Buy-and-busts - in which an undercover officer
buys drugs from a suspect, then immediately arrests him - are indis-
pensable to the arrest and prosecution of drug dealers.5 ' Were the
Court to forbid undercover tactics altogether, this valuable technique
for enforcement would, obviously, be thwarted. So the Court permits
them; transsubstantivity means it permits them everywhere. We then
get undercover tactics that are a lot harder to swallow, such as when
agents pose as coworkers, friends, or even lovers, creating entire hu-
man relationships built on dust.52
Try the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause next. Unlike
the Fourth Amendment, the Self-Incrimination Clause does not employ
a reasonableness test that balances government and private interests
- it is rather a promise that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled ... to
be a witness against himself. '5 3 But a transsubstantive interpretation
does not fulfill this promise equally for different kinds of defendants.
Applying Miranda's strict conduct rules to terrorism cases, for exam-
ple, yields untenable results (and doubtless discourages the government
from bringing criminal charges in the first place). Sophisticated terror
suspects can hide behind Miranda's protection, closing their lips
around information vital to national security.54 Analogous problems
inhere more broadly, stemming from differences not only among
crimes, but also among criminals. Defendants in drug cases, for ex-
ample, are mostly repeat offenders, experienced in the system; rape de-
fendants, in contrast, often have clean records 55 and probably enter in-
terrogations in a more emotionally vulnerable state. For the former,
Miranda is a fortress; for the latter, it is a flimsy shield, if anything at
48 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2OO1), in which the Court rebuffed the argu-
ment that custodial arrest was unreasonable for nonjailable offenses, see id. at 346-49, may suffer
the same ailments.
49 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 801-o2
(1994).
50 See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1820-21 (1998).
51 See id. at 1820.
52 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 314-2 1 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
54 For example, Miranda forbids the police from questioning a suspect after he requests a law-
yer. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, I56 (199o).
55 See 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 454 tbl.5.53.
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all.56 Transsubstantive regulation means that to hand over the shield,
courts must also build the fortress.
Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance cases also reveal transsub-
stantivity's flaws. On a basic level, defendants with more at stake
probably deserve more effective representation. But attention should
be paid as well to the nature and complexity of the trial that a given
crime necessitates. Compare United States v. Cronic57 and Strickland
v. Washington, 5  two seminal ineffective assistance cases handed down
the same day in 1984. David Leroy Washington's life hung in the bal-
ance after he pled guilty to a trio of capital murder charges against the
advice of his lawyer. At Washington's sentencing hearing, his lawyer
made the strategic decision to rely solely on the plea colloquy and thus
to forego presentation of further mitigating evidence. 59 The trial judge
sentenced Washington to death.60  The Supreme Court upheld Wash-
ington's sentence, finding his lawyer's efforts at sentencing neither ob-
jectively unreasonable nor unduly prejudicial. 61
Harrison Cronic, by contrast, stood trial for mail fraud. (Perhaps
surprisingly, many fraud defendants cannot afford good lawyers62 and
face nonnegligible time behind bars for their misdeeds.63) His attorney
had only twenty-five days to prepare for a four-day jury trial that
commanded over four years of government preparation, including
thousands of pages of document review. 64 Cronic's lawyer, no matter
how skilled or sincere, could not conceivably have unraveled the gov-
ernment's case. And unlike in Strickland, strategic inaction in Cronic
was not a possibility. Sure enough, Cronic was convicted and sen-
56 Professor Louis Seidman argues that Miranda makes vulnerable suspects worse off by im-
munizing Miranda-compliant police interrogations. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miran-
da, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 744-46 (1992); see also William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 975, 977 (2001) ("Because of Miranda, sophisticated suspects have a right to be free from
questioning altogether - not simply free from coercive questioning - while unsophisticated sus-
pects have very nearly no protection at all. The first group receives more than it deserves, while
the second receives less than it needs."). One study found that suspects with felony records were
three to four times more likely to invoke Miranda rights than those with clean or misdemeanor
records. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
266, 286 (1996).
57 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
58 466 U.S. 668 (984).
59 Id. at 672-73. Although the failure to seek out mitigating evidence would be unreasonable
in the vast majority of cases, it made some sense in Strickland, for it prevented the prosecution
from cross-examining Washington and putting forth rebuttal evidence. See id. at 673.
60 Id. at 675.
61 See id. at 698-99.
62 According to one study, although white-collar criminals have assets that surpass those of
common criminals, on average their liabilities surpass those assets. See DAVID WEISBURD ET
AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES 63 tbl. 3 .3 , 65 & n.I9 (1991). Perpetrators of mail fraud
tend to have particularly unimpressive finances. See id. at 5o-5I & tbl.3 .1, 57-59.
63 See 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 458 tbl.5.6o.
64 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649, 652 (1984).
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tenced to twenty-five years in prison.65 After condoning the perform-
ance of Washington's attorney, however - who barely lifted a finger
- the Court could not possibly rebuke Cronic's. The Court's trans-
substantive mindset forced it to tie the standard for fraud defense to
that for capital sentencing defense (and, likely, capital sentencing de-
fense to larceny defense, or something similarly run-of-the-mill).66 But
fraud, capital sentencing, and larceny cases are nothing alike; fraud
cases are the most complex by far, and the resources needed to defend
a larceny charge would hardly make a dent in a complex fraud case
like Cronic's. Unsurprisingly, fewer defendants opt for trial in fraud
cases than for virtually any other felony.67 Indigent fraud defendants
have almost no shot at effective assistance of counsel in a transsub-
stantive world.
Criminal procedure could be otherwise. A shift toward substance-
specific procedural regulation could happen in either of two ways.
First, the Supreme Court itself could craft substance-specific rules in
its opinions. Against the greater tide of transsubstantivity, the Court
has done so on occasion, 6 and the sky has not fallen. But a better so-
lution, for institutional reasons discussed in greater depth below, 69
might be for the Court to retreat strategically, giving room for legisla-
tive and executive actors to regulate procedure. These institutions, of
course, would be free, and should be encouraged, to regulate in a sub-
stance-specific manner.70 The Court would retain the ultimate respon-
65 Id. at 65o.
66 The StricklandlCronic example suggests that fraud cases, on average, probably require
more time and specialized knowledge than capital sentencing cases do. This observation, how-
ever, is not at all intended to dull the argument that capital cases, too, should require a heightened
standard of effective representation. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 715-17 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Indeed, the capital/noncapital distinction only furthers the substance specificity thesis
this Part advances. The Court's refusal to recognize expressly the significance of the capi-
tal/noncapital divide has contributed to its warped, ad hoc ineffective assistance doctrine. See
Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2471 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Some states have recog-
nized that capital cases call for especially effective counsel. See, e.g., Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d
i8i, 182 (Ga. 1989).
67 2003 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 457 tbl.5.57; ONLINE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at
tbl.5.46.2002, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebooklpdf/t5462002.pdf.
68 See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (I984) (rejecting an exigent circumstances
justification for a house search related to a noncriminal traffic violation); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
i, 30 (1968) (limiting the legality of stop-and-frisks to situations in which the police reasonably
suspect that a target has committed or is about to commit a crime associated with the use of
weapons). Justice Breyer recently advocated a substance-specific rule that considers domestic
abuse. See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. I515, 1529 (2oo6) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing
that, despite the general rule the majority opinion established, consent by a possible victim of do-
mestic abuse should render a home search reasonable over the objection of the victim's partner).
69 See infra pp. 2548-49.
70 Evidence suggests that in spaces Supreme Court jurisprudence has not occupied, other ac-
tors have regulated in a substance-specific fashion. Compare, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S.
i, 7-10 (1989) (denying a right to counsel for habeas proceedings, even in a capital case), with 21
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sibility for passing on the constitutional adequacy of the solutions de-
vised, which would undoubtedly generate its own challenges. But the
Court would be better situated to surmount these new obstacles than
to cut procedural rules from whole cloth as it does today.71
The greatest vulnerability of a substance-specific scheme is its
complexity. Lawyers and police would have to learn multiple sets of
procedures, a burden that would fall most heavily on police, who lack
the time to categorize each incident they confront and select the proper
protocol from the shelf. But this objection, however strong it sounds,
is exaggerated. Similar crimes could be grouped together, creating a
small number of procedural categories. And again, the little bit of
substance-specific procedural law we currently have - such as a few
Fourth Amendment rules - suggests that street police can handle
some complexity.7 2 Lawyers and detectives, who make their decisions
in relative calm, should encounter even fewer problems. On top of
that, police departments, prosecutors' offices, and defense bars might
specialize (many already do), forming substance-specific subunits or-
ganized around the relevant procedural law. A fear of complexity
should not stand in the way of substance specificity's great benefits.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
A second line between the administrative and criminal procedure
constitutions concerns judicial review of agency action. The adminis-
trative constitution entrusts agencies with ponderous legislative and
judicial responsibilities. When executing these charges, agencies are
guided by the administrative constitution's structural and procedural
protections7 3 and are subject to reasonableness review in the courts.
This review entails a relatively searching examination of the agency's
reasoning process to ensure that the agency did not draw its conclu-
sions in an "arbitrary or capricious" manner.14 Courts investigate
whether the agency considered the relevant factors and ignored irrele-
vant ones.7 5 They check the agency's resolution against agency prece-
U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000) (conferring such a right solely in capital cases), amended by Pub. L.
No. 109-177, tit. II, § 221, i2o Stat. 192, 231 (2006). Sometimes the substance-specific regulation
is informal rather than on the books. See, e.g., L.A. County Dist. Attorney's Office, LADA
Crimes of Violence, http://da.co.la.ca.us/violentcrimes.htm (last visited May 13, 20o6) (cataloguing
a large number of specialized prosecutorial units with unique interests and investigatory proce-
dures, such as a stalking unit that emphasizes victim privacy).
71 See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 541-42.
72 See Stuntz, supra note 4o, at 852.
73 See Barkow, supra note 14, at 1021-23.
74 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43
(983).
75 See id. at 43.
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dent7 6 and inspect the record for evidence sufficient to support the
agency's conclusion. 77  If the record contains serious objections, the
agency must offer good reasons for rejecting those arguments. 78
For a standard rooted in the seemingly deferential words "arbitrary
or capricious," this review, often called "hard look" review, can have
serious bite. In State Farm, for example - the seminal hard look case
- the Supreme Court invalidated the federal government's decision to
eliminate passive restraint rules for automobiles. 79 Before rescinding
the passive restraint rule, the agency received comments, held public
hearings, and concluded that the passive restraint requirement would
not produce significant safety benefits.8 0 The Supreme Court over-
turned the agency's action for failing to consider policy alternatives,
such as mandatory airbags, that were within the ambit of the existing
regulatory standard.8 1
Of course, hard look review does not escape controversy. Adminis-
trative law scholars perpetually bat about allegations that the practice
has ossified administrative procedure and is repugnant to the spirit, if
not the letter, of Vermont Yankee.82  But despite the uproar, the Su-
preme Court has not backed down, perhaps recognizing that much of
the legitimacy of the administrative state rests on the shoulders of
careful judicial review. 3 Hard look review strikes a balance between
administrative expediency and the liberties protected by Articles I and
III of the Constitution. The government may arrange its affairs to act
expediently, but never irrationally.
In the criminal context, the balance shifts dramatically toward ex-
pediency. Judicial review of administrative action in criminal law -
review of plea bargains, specifically - bears no resemblance to hard
76 GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 33, at 97; Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-
Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177, 182.
77 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43-44.
78 See Sunstein, supra note 76, at 182.
79 See 463 U.S. at 46.
80 Id. at 38.
81 See id. at 46-57. According to one commentator, "[t]he Supreme Court's invalidation of an
extremely hasty and ill-considered decision to scrap those rules will ultimately save many lives."
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989
DUKE L.J. 522, 528.
82 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59, 67 0995) ("[T]he judicially enforced duty to engage in reasoned decisionmaking is the
largest single source of judicial ossification of the rulemaking process . . . ."); see also Carl
McGowan, Reflections on Rulemaking Review, 53 TUL. L. REV. 681, 689 (979) (opining that
combining Vermont Yankee's restrained procedural review with searching substantive review
"presents all the elements of paradox").
83 See Barkow, supra note 14, at 1023 (asserting that judicial review has played a major role in
"the Court's acceptance of broad delegations of legislative and judicial power to executive agen-
cies"); Sunstein, supra note 8i, at 525 (observing that "the basic function of the courts might be
described as the promotion of 'legitimacy' in the administrative process").
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look review.8 4 Courts overseeing the plea process glance merely to see
whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and grounded in a factual
basis.8 5  That a plea was offered solely to avoid the death penalty, and
amid protestations of innocence, does not suffice to invalidate it.86
Prosecutors are free to threaten any legal sanction, change course from
case to case, and reject defendants' offers and arguments for no reason
at all (or worse, for illegitimate reasons).8 ' And defendants have no
discovery rights to assess the evidence against them before pleading.
8
The only meaningful review of a prosecutor's "adjudication" of guilt
comes when a defendant rolls the dice and insists on trial. But be-
cause trials carry the risk of harsher punishment, pressure to plead
guilty can be tremendous, even for innocent defendants.8 9
Of course, plea bargaining in practice may not be so haphazard as
this alarming description makes it sound. Judge Gerard Lynch de-
scribes a "common law" of plea bargaining in which prosecutors are
guided by a combination of formal office policy, precedent, and a de-
sire for equity among similarly situated defendants. 90 But as Judge
Lynch also points out, this common law is informal and unpublished,
which has two major ramifications. It advantages defendants repre-
sented by "insider" counsel who are in the know.91 Only these attor-
neys will understand enough about prosecutors' precedents and poli-
84 Barkow, supra note 14, at 1026 (concluding that prosecutors "face only a cursory judicial
inquiry" rather than "being subject to the hard-look review that other agencies face"). Hard look
review inspects the agency's reasoning process; plea bargains face no such review. Indeed, the
prosecutor "[miost commonly ... simply accepts the results of the police investigation." Lynch,
supra note 7, at 2124. The criminal justice system also lacks the political safeguards that help
check administrative agency abuse. See Barkow, supra note 14, at io28-3I. But see Richman,
supra note 14 (arguing that Congress delicately considers prosecutorial accountability when dele-
gating criminal enforcement authority).
85 See FED. R. CRIM. P. ii(b). Judge Lynch has painted the plea review process as "a five-
minute interview of the person, under Rule ii, getting a kind of half-hearted, scripted confession
as part of the guilty plea process." Panel, supra note 7, at 684 (footnote omitted).
86 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (970).
87 Of course, the prosecutor may not reject a defendant's argument for reasons such as racial
prejudice, but masking prejudice is simple. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 2129; see also Barkow,
supra note 14, at 1027 ("Prosecutors need not treat similar cases similarly.... and they need not
explain why they agreed to reach a deal with one defendant, but refused to do so with another
defendant guilty of the same crime."). Some empirical studies have revealed massive discrepan-
cies in the bargains offered to white and nonwhite defendants. See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
ON CIVIL RIGHTS & LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 14-16 (2ooo), available at http://
www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/cj/justice.pdf. Even the most informal adjudication un-
der the administrative constitution, by contrast, requires a written statement of the basis for de-
nial of a claim. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2000).
88 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (suggesting that the defendant's right to
access evidence against him is distinctly a trial right).
89 Barkow, supra note 14, at 1034; see also Lynch, supra note 7, at 2146.
90 See Lynch, supra note 7, at 2 131-32.
91 Id. at 2132.
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cies to demand fair treatment. it also fails to carry the force of law.
Although prosecutors may follow past policy, defendants have no re-
course aside from trial should their prosecutor diverge. The prosecu-
tor's commitment to fairness is a slender reed for defendants to grasp.
Try selling the defendant in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,92 for example,
on the protections of plea bargaining's common law. Hayes's misdeed
was forging a check for $88.30, an offense punishable by two to ten
years' imprisonment under Kentucky law. The prosecutor offered a
five-year sentence if Hayes pled guilty; if not, he threatened to reindict
Hayes under Kentucky's three-strikes law, subjecting him to a poten-
tial mandatory life sentence. Hayes rejected the five-year deal; he was
convicted at trial and dealt the life sentence he had been promised. 93
Hayes argued that the reindictment violated the Constitution's ban on
vindictive prosecution. 94 The Supreme Court rebuffed this argument,
reasoning that because the prosecutor's threat was legal - because
Hayes was plainly eligible for prosecution under the three-strikes law
- no foul had been committed. 95
How might Hayes's case have looked different under § 706 - un-
der the administrative, rather than the criminal procedure, constitu-
tion?96 If the prosecutor had been, for example, an agent of the SEC?
For one thing, reasonableness review would have applied. The Court
would have inquired whether the threat against Hayes was consistent
with agency precedent - that is, whether the prosecutor had actually
exacted the threatened penalty in similar cases. (Mandatory data col-
lection and, possibly, "sentencing guidelines" for pleas would help
guide this inquiry.) The Court would also have considered whether
the prosecutor's decision was based on irrelevant factors, such as
prejudice. If Hayes had offered to plead guilty for a sentence lighter
than five years, the Court would have asked whether the prosecutor
typically accepted such offers and, if so, why he rejected Hayes's. 97
92 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
93 Id. at 358-59.
94 See id. at 360.
95 Id. at 364-65. One discomfort with the result in Bordenkircher relates to an anticoercion
principle the Supreme Court espoused in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (19o8): "A law which indi-
rectly [prevents judicial review] by imposing such conditions upon the right to appeal for judicial
relief as work an abandonment of the right rather than face the conditions upon which it is of-
fered or may be obtained is ... unconstitutional." Id. at 147.
96 A paradigm shift toward the administrative approach could occur in two ways. Congress
and state legislatures could pass legislation subjecting plea bargains to something resembling arbi-
trary and capricious review, or courts could read the Due Process Clauses, which have long been
understood to prohibit arbitrary government behavior, as requiring the same scrutiny.
97 To be sure, a determined prosecutor could probably justify almost any legally authorized
outcome. Presumably, however, extreme or unusual bargains would demand more compelling
justifications to pass muster. In this sense, hard look review might make the most sense under a
signaling theory: the prosecutor's willingness to expend the resources necessary to produce a de-
2544
COMPARATIVE DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
After all of these inquiries, the Court still might have found the
bargain constitutionally spotless - and that would be fine. Reason-
ableness review, after all, is not a backdoor attempt to undermine the
system of plea bargaining, just as hard look review scarcely paralyzes
administrative agency action. 9s Some agencies, in fact, conduct up-
wards of io,ooo informal adjudications per year subject to reasonable-
ness review. Most orders from these agencies contain little or no ex-
planation; detailed justifications are provided only in response to
challenges. 99 Prosecutors might function similarly.10 0 Reasonableness
review, at bottom, simply strives to maintain the legitimacy of a system
in which the executive dominates cases and controversies from start to
finish and to enforce basic due process principles of equal treatment,
nonarbitrary government action, and a general allergy to coercion. 10 1
IV. PROCESS-GENERATING PROCEDURAL RULES
An argument about the quantity or level of constitutional regula-
tion, such as the one tendered in Part III, says nothing about the qual-
ity or nature of that regulation. Traversing this ground begins with
Vermont Yankee, which forbade courts from imposing procedural re-
quirements that go beyond the dictates of the APA. In large part,
Vermont Yankee took courts out of the business of writing administra-
tive procedure, leaving such regulation to legislatures and agencies.
But Vermont Yankee does not mean that courts never issue opinions
that impact administrative procedure - they do. When they do, they
tend to use process-generating rules - rules encouraging other gov-
ernment bodies to attend to formal process but not dictating the use of
particular procedural devices. Courts regulating criminal procedure,
by contrast, have wielded an arsenal of process-imposing rules, which
demand that specific actors undertake or refrain from certain actions.
This distinction between the types of procedural rules courts employ
tailed justification would signal that the benefits of the unusual bargain are high. See generally
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of Hard Look Review (John M. Olin Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 539, 2006), available at http://www.
law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/Stephenson-539.pdf.
98 See William S. Jordan, HI, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rule-
making?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393, 440-41 (2000) (reporting empirical findings that "seriously un-
dermine[] the proposition that hard look review prevents agencies from achieving their regulatory
goals").
99 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 224-25 (2oo1).
100 Defendants would raise reasonableness challenges along with extant claims on appeal or in
a habeas petition. Reasonableness review would thus burden the criminal process little more than
the addition of any other substantive right giving rise to a cognizable claim.
101 See Sunstein, supra note 81, at 525.
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forms a third basis for comparing the administrative and criminal pro-
cedure constitutions.
Three examples illustrate the pattern of process-generating rules in
administrative law. The first is Mead. Mead is a refinement of Chev-
ron,10 2 which established the rule that courts defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of law when Congress has not directly answered
the precise question at issue. 10 3 Mead honed Chevron by identifying a
class of cases in which this deference does not obtain. After Mead,
deference typically applies only when Congress has delegated authority
to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law and the agency
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that author-
ity.10 4 As a general rule - and here is the connection to process - the
force of law adheres when agencies employ formal procedures. 0 5 The
Court in Mead never told agencies what procedural devices to use, so
Mead's rule does not contravene Vermont Yankee. Nor did the Court
require formal process at all. But by tying Chevron deference to the
use of formal procedures, the Court created a powerful incentive for
formality.106 Mead encourages Congress to attend to formal proce-
dures by incentivizing Congress to grant agencies the power to act
with the force of law; it reaches agencies, too, by hinging interpretive
deference on their decision to wield that power.
Nondelegation doctrine provides a second instance of judicially au-
thored process-generating rules in administrative law. In A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,107 the Supreme Court struck
down a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act that dele-
gated to the President power to promulgate codes to regulate unfair
competition. Crucial to the Court's decision was the Act's failure to
provide for administrative procedures by which the President was to
carry out his delegated authority.108 Procedural defects also plagued
the regulations challenged successfully in Panama Refining Co. v.
102 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
103 See id. at 842-44.
104 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30.
105 See id. at 230 ("Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and delib-
eration that should underlie a pronouncement of such force."); see also David J. Barron & Elena
Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2ooi Sup. CT. REV. 201, 2ii (asserting that the "chief'
factor for a court deciding whether to defer to an agency interpretation is "the degree of proce-
dural formality involved in the action").
106 See Barron & Kagan, supra note 1O5, at 203 (asserting that Mead established a "preference
for formality"). Skidmore deference - the type of deference an agency gets when it fails to qual-
ify for Chevron treatment - varies directly with formal process as well. See Mead, 533 U.S. at
228.
107 295 U.S. 495 (935)-
108 See id. at 533.
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Ryan'0 9 that same year and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.1" 0 the next."'
These decisions, basically the Court's last words in nondelegation, con-
tinue to provide Congress with incentives to prescribe at least a
framework of procedures for agencies to follow in the exercise of dele-
gated power. Again, the Court did not command any particular pro-
cedures or even any specific level of process. It simply provided incen-
tives for process and left the details to the decisionmakers closer to the
ground.
A final example is hard look review, which also affects agency pro-
cedure through rules that are process-generating rather than process-
imposing. Courts conducting hard look review permit agencies to
proceed undisturbed as long as their decisionmaking processes are rea-
sonable. This practice provides incentives for agencies to implement
whatever procedures will produce a sufficient record for review."
2
Some agencies, for example, may write opinions explaining the ration-
ale behind their decisions." 3 Other agencies are free to handle the
matter differently.
Judicial regulation of criminal procedure reads from a different
book. A prolix code of judge-written rules directly regulates most fac-
ets of the criminal process. Fourth and Fifth Amendment law are two
of the densest examples, prescribing "constitutional standards so exten-




Treatises containing criminal procedure's process-imposing rules are
volumes long, spanning an array of matters such as police interroga-
tion, waiver of rights, jury selection, ineffective assistance of counsel,
and double jeopardy. Simply put, constitutional criminal procedure,
where it regulates, "occupies the field."
1 5
This intricate judicial imposition of process inflicts a number of
painful injuries on the criminal justice system. For one, detailed regu-
109 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
110 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
III See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 33, at 14, 25.
112 Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), made clear the central-
ity of the administrative record to hard look review. See id. at 419-2o; see also Merrick B. Gar-
land, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 530 (1985) ("[Hard look require-
ments] focus not on the kind of procedure that an agency must use to generate a record, but
rather on the kind of decisionmaking record the agency must produce to survive judicial review;
the method of generating the record is left to the agency itself.").
113 GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 33, at 102 ("The net effect of [the hard look] cases is to
give agency decisionmakers a strong incentive to write opinions to accompany their actions, even
when procedural law does not compel them to do so.").
114 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.1, at 469 (2d ed. 1999).
115 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 17. Some steps of the criminal process, such as prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking, "are barely touched by constitutional controls." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 114,
§ 2.1, at 469. Nevertheless, for those steps that are, "no other nation has so large and intricate a
corpus of law relating to criminal justice emerged from constitutional interpretation." Id.
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lation of conduct (and the litigation such regulation engenders) shifts
focus from ends to means, both rhetorically and empirically. An im-
portant end of the criminal justice system is producing just outcomes
- in particular, innocent people should never be punished. A particu-
lar procedural device - such as the Fifth Amendment or the myriad
rules that implement it - is arguably a means to achieve just out-
comes, not an end itself.' 16 But because the criminal procedure consti-
tution says so much about conduct and so little about outcomes and
incentives, rhetoric about "enforcing the Constitution" has become
synonymous with a fixation on means - for example, on Miranda vio-
lations. Criminal litigation, too, bears out the means-ends problem at
more than a rhetorical level. Defense attorneys strapped for resources
substitute procedural claims for merits claims, the latter being much
more costly to prepare." 7  Process imposition encourages this dynamic
by filling defense counsel's plate with virtually limitless procedural se-
lections.II8 At bottom, the judicial focus on conduct distracts from un-
just outcomes.
Process imposition also changes the identity of the primary proce-
dural regulator. Whereas the political branches decide day-to-day pro-
cedural issues in process-generating regimes, judges make the calls in
process-imposing ones. But having judges enforce detailed conduct
rules against their political counterparts is a recipe for rotten politics;
at some point, judicial implementation of a code of decorum for politi-
cal actors is simply too intrusive. Professor Clark Byse, in an article
lauding the Vermont Yankee decision for forbidding just this practice,
argues the point for administrative law. "It is not ... a proper recogni-
tion of the role and responsibility of administrative agencies," Professor
Byse suggests, "for the reviewing court to order the administrators to
adopt a particular procedural device if the desideratum might be
achieved by a less intrusive mechanism."119 In addition to fostering
resentment among the branches, this form of procedural lawmaking is
inefficient.120 Moreover, process-imposing rules stifle innovation by
116 This sentiment inspired Judge Friendly's influential article arguing that federal habeas re-
view should focus on innocence, not on technical procedural violations. See Henry J. Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142-43,
156-57 (1970); cf Byse, supra note 2o, at 1828 (making the means-end point for administrative
procedure).
117 See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 40-45.
118 See id.
119 Byse, supra note 20, at 1828.
120 Id. ("By prescribing a particular procedure the court prevents the agency, which has the
firstline responsibility and experience in administering the statute, from utilizing that experience
to provide the needed record in the most cost-effective fashion."); cf. Stuntz, supra note 39, at 827("Legislators know more about relevant policy alternatives than courts do. The goal of constitu-
tional law should be to prompt elected officials to put that information to good use, not to have
Supreme Court Justices choose among the policy alternatives themselves.").
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legislatures and agencies that, if left alone, might succeed in fashioning
superior alternative procedures that achieve the desired ends.
In the criminal justice system, the effects of process imposition on
constitutional politics are especially severe. Process-imposing rules are
authored by the actors with the least information: appellate judges.
Although judges are thought to be experts on procedure, they know lit-
tle about crime rates and funding decisions, both indispensable consid-
erations for informed regulation. 12 I And it gets worse. Through a sort
of mischievous political dance, "[j]udicially mandated procedures make
legislators and prosecutors natural allies. 1 22 By itself, this partnership
sounds benign, but when it works to undermine the courts, it can be
quite malignant. When legislatures disagree with court-imposed pro-
cedures, they help prosecutors avoid them by increasing sentences and
broadening the substantive criminal code, giving prosecutors a daunt-
ing stack of chips to bring to the plea bargaining table.123  Defendants
eye these chips and fold, and the courts' extensive conduct rules end
up moot. Some of this might help explain why "[i]n no other western
society has the regulation of police and prosecutorial officials, as well
as the functioning of the courts, been understood in comparable degree
to be a function of judges.' 24
Worse yet, intensive process imposition chokes off funding for po-
licing and adjudication - the areas the criminal procedure constitu-
tion regulates most closely and, consequently, legislatures regulate
least. Because legislatures do not like to spend where they cannot
regulate, policing and adjudication get the short end of the stick.
25
Legislatures prefer not to buy enforcement of rights they did not enact,
so funding for public defenders suffers. 26  The real money flows to
corrections, where legislatures have plenty of room to regulate.
127
As with transsubstantivity and judicial review of plea bargains,
criminal procedure need not be this way. Process-generating regula-
tion of criminal procedure is possible. Courts could start by turning
their process-imposing rules into default rules - rules that apply only
121 See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 4 ("[The law that defines what the criminal process looks like,
the law that defines defendants' rights, is made by judges and Justices who have little information
about crime rates and funding decisions, and whose incentives to take account of those factors
may be perverse."); see also Francis A. Allen, Central Problems of American Criminal Justice, 75
MICH. L. REV. 813, 8s8 (i977); Allen, supra note 71, at 523.
122 Stuntz, supra note 39, at 803.
123 See id. ("Prosecutors treat laws defining crimes and sentences as bargaining chips, while
legislators liberally supply the chips."); id. at 819.
124 Allen, supra note 71, at 523.
125 See Stuntz, supra note 39, at 81o; see also id. at 8ii ("Had Fourth and Fifth Amendment
law left legislators more space to regulate, [funding] statistics might look very different.").
126 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 55.
127 Stuntz, supra note 39, at 8o9-Io.
2549200o6]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:2530
until legislatures craft alternative solutions. This move would shift the
locus of day-to-day regulation to political actors. 128  Strickland's ap-
proach to ineffective assistance, for example, might be jettisoned in fa-
vor of an incentive-based alternative. To remedy the funding prob-
lems that are largely responsible for ineffective assistance, courts could
ask legislatures to establish expert commissions to recommend appro-
priate funding schemes. In jurisdictions that complied and imple-
mented the commissions' recommendations, ineffective assistance doc-
trine would apply minimally; other jurisdictions would get
a double dose. 129  Legislatures would have strong incentives to fix
funding, but through a system that would make Justice Brandeis
proud. 130 As a bonus, legislatures would be free to craft substance-
specific solutions.
The reasonableness review of plea bargains that Part III suggests is
another example. A process-imposing approach to plea bargain review
might require prosecutors to recite certain warnings or refrain from
particular threats. Reasonableness review avoids this intrusion. 13
Under a reasonableness regime, prosecutors - seeking to have their
bargains upheld - would devise procedures to demonstrate reason-
ableness to the courts. They might, for instance, write brief opinions
outlining the weight of the evidence, the context, and the defendant's
offers or arguments. Maintaining detailed plea and punishment data
would also help prosecutors justify bargains. It would be in prosecu-
tors' interests, not against them, to adhere to these procedures, which
would match their resources and organization. Furthermore, legisla-
tures - wanting to preserve an effective plea system, which saves sig-
nificant sums of money - would back these efforts at procedural
regulation rather than undermine them.
128 See Allen, supra note 71, at 541-42 (arguing that "the Court will not succeed [in regulating
the criminal justice system] unless it stimulates a constructive response from the localities and the
other branches of government"); cf Williams, supra note 19, at 454-55 (encouraging courts to re-
view agencies' decisions in a way that would "assure that issues are aired sufficiently for [courts]
to perform [their] function of substantive review, without impinging upon the ability of the agency
to select the procedural devices that appear most suitable in light of the substantive issues in-
volved and the agency's institutional capacities").
129 See Stuntz, supra note 39, at 837.
130 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (ad-
vancing his laboratories-of-democracy understanding of federalism).
131 Cf Williams, supra note I9, at 455-56 (discussing devices courts can use to "disciplin[e]
agency action without entangling it in elaborate procedures"). "Whether a court should ever
mandate the use of any particular device," Professor Williams continues, "seems doubtful. But
the courts ... may demand that agencies develop a record that enables a reviewing court to find
an intelligible answer for each substantial challenge posed. Under these judicial pressures, agen-




V. CONCLUSION: REDRAWING THE MAP
Transsubstantive procedural regulation, virtually limitless plea bar-
gaining discretion, and judicial oversight through detailed process-
imposing rules are characteristic landforms on the criminal procedure
map. This Note seeks to reshape criminal procedure by comparing its
landscape to the topography of the administrative constitution - the
APA.
Countless stones have been left unturned. Under the administra-
tive constitution, for example, agencies commonly promulgate rules
that bind both themselves and the public. This practice enhances no-
tice by informing the public of the actual bounds of enforceable regu-
lation. It also reins in the discretion of law enforcers by making them
commit publicly to pursuing certain types of violations. Substantial
arguments can be marshaled for importing rulemaking practice into
the criminal context.132
Alignment with the administrative constitution does not demarcate
the limits of viable criminal procedure reform. In some ways, criminal
procedure might aspire to go further than administrative procedure.
Consider hard look review, for example. Parts III and IV suggest that
courts should review the plea bargaining process for reasonableness. It
is important to note, however, that courts use hard look review in ad-
ministrative law partly for second-best reasons: they lack the technical
expertise necessary to delve into agencies' substantive and policy deci-
sions. 133 But courts reviewing a mountain of criminal cases probably
do have the expertise necessary to determine which trial courts gener-
ate the most procedural errors or wrongful convictions. As a result,
courts are in a position to threaten these jurisdictions with a harder
look, heightening incentives for improved process.
The point of this Note is not that criminal procedure must look just
like administrative procedure, though changes in that direction would
make sense. Instead, it is more that criminal procedure need not look
just like criminal procedure does today. This insight is what compara-
tive constitutionalism seeks to demonstrate about the American Con-
stitution when it compares the document to those of foreign nations.
This is what comparative domestic constitutionalism, too, is all about.
132 See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 8o-84.
133 See Jordan, supra note 98, at 397-400.
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